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1. The end is nigh? 
Since its original publication in Wired magazine nearly a decade ago, much has been 
said about Chris Anderson’s article ‘The End of Theory’. In this provocative piece, 
Anderson describes a technological present in which algorithms and software 
generate insight in ways that human experts and specialists cannot. For Anderson, 
the truth regimes of theories and theorists are “becoming obsolete” because high-
performance and high-speed computational operations are now driving both 
invention and discovery. It is data – in fact, “massive amounts” of it – that offers a 
key to uncovering the secrets of the world. Computing possesses an ability unlike 
anything before it to collect and manage this Big Data into patterns for human 
consumption. It does so with no need for experiments, models and hypotheses, but 
rather by merely allowing the “numbers to speak for themselves” (Anderson, 2008). 
 
Under different guises, the prospect of the end of theory that Anderson described in 
2008 has been resonating in a variety of intellectual conversations about new 
technologies. It is mirrored, for instance, within debates in the digital humanities, 
where the slogan ‘more hack, less yack’ has been circulating for some years. The 
prospect of the end of theory is also reflected in popular concerns about the end of 
cognitive work due to algorithmic automation, and in related worries about the 
shrinking of human intellectual faculties in a society where rational decision is 
increasingly delegated to machines. Moreover, the prospect of the end of theory 
returns in the never-fulfilled methodological gaps between practical work and 
theoretical work, or in the never-resolved conflictual dichotomy between thought 
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and action. It also thrives in the present emphasis on ‘making’ as a more authentic 
mode of both individual and public engagement with the digital. 
 
In what follows, I wish to take the launch of a new journal of media theory and its 
inaugural issue as an opportunity to reflect on this condition, and to address the 
concept of ‘theory’: a concept that has been celebrated by some, but which has been 
declared to be dead by others. My ambition here is not to offer an exhaustive 
treatment of what ‘theory’ might be in relation to media and media studies. Instead, I 
will signpost a few issues that demonstrate, in my view, how a post-mortem for 
theory is not necessary, as the patient is in fact alive and well. My aim is thus to offer 
some reflections on the role of theory in general, and on the role of media theory 
specifically, in order to show the continued relevance of some form of theoretical 
enquiry or speculative endeavour. 
 
 
2. Creating an Abstract System 
Anderson’s ‘The End of Theory’ was not the first announcement of theory’s 
purported demise and, most likely, it will not be the last. An ambiguity inherent in 
the term ‘theory’ can be considered to be at least partly responsible for the bad press 
that the concept often receives. Although the origin of the word is clear (it derives 
from the ancient Greek theōria, meaning contemplation and speculation), 1  the use to 
which the term is put is often less so. There is in fact a contrast between its technical 
and colloquial usages. Scholarly speaking, a theory is as sound as its power for 
generality. In common speech, however, ‘to have a theory’ often indicates nothing 
more than having a glorified guess or a lucky hunch. In my view, this discrepancy is 
interesting, for it highlights how, in both cases, it is the speculative and at the same 
time totalising aim of theoretical work that appears to cause concern or disaffection. 
1 In the essay ‘Science and Reflection’, Martin Heidegger gives an etymology of the notion of theory. 
He writes: “The word ‘theory’ stems from the Greek verb theōrein. The noun belonging to it is theōria. 
Peculiar to these words is a lofty and mysterious meaning. The verb theōrein grew out of the coalescing 
of two root words, thea and horaō. Thea (cf. theater) is the outward look, the aspect, in which 
something shows itself, the outward appearance in which it offers itself. Plato names this aspect in 
which what presences shows what it is, eídos. To have seen this aspect, eidenai, is to know [wissen]. The 
second root word in theōrein, horaō, means: to look at something attentively, to look it over, to look it 
closely. Thus, it follows that theōrein is thean horan, to look attentively on the outward appearance 
wherein what presences becomes visible and, through such sigh – seeing – to linger with it” 
(Heidegger, 1977: 163). 108  
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To theorise is indeed often understood in terms of moving away from the reality that 
the theory was meant to account for. On this somewhat caricatural view of the 
activity of the theorist, to engage in the production of theory is to refuse to 
participate in the world, and to choose instead a life of the mind that bears little 
resemblance to that of the world. To call for the end of theory, then, or to refuse to 
engage in theoretical work, is often seen as an attempt to protest such detachment: 
empirical or practical work is seen as more concrete, and making ‘stuff’ is regarded as 
more honest than just thinking about it. 
 
In order to explain and expand on this point, one can consider how Fredric Jameson 
distinguished between theory on the one hand, and philosophy on the other. The 
latter, for Jameson, is “always haunted by the dream of some foolproof, self-
sufficient, autonomous system, a set of interlocking concepts which are their own 
cause”. Theory, by contrast, “has no vested interests inasmuch as it never lays claim 
to an absolute system, a non-ideological formulation of itself and its ‘truths’; indeed, 
always itself complicit in the being of current language, it has only the never-ending, 
never-finished task and vocation of undermining philosophy as such, of unravelling 
affirmative statements and propositions of all kinds” (2009: 59). Jameson’s 
distinction can be seen to be epitomised in and by the intellectual efforts of 
poststructuralism, whose challenge to institutional and ideological forms of 
knowledge is accompanied by a particular attention to and care for the minoritarian, 
material and genealogical aspects of thought. When looking at the role of theoretical 
research in contemporary technoculture, I believe that it is necessary to acknowledge 
these debates. The prospect of an ‘end of theory’ should thus be situated within the 
broader context of long-standing critiques of rationalism and logocentrism. After all, 
long before Anderson’s article (and to a very different extent and aim), 
postmodernism announced the imminent collapse of all master discourses, grand 
narratives and metalanguages, and cast a cloud of deep suspicion over universalist 
and universalising modes of thinking. 
 
For the scope of the present discussion, however, I will not pursue the postmodern 
opposition between philosophy and theory in a rationalist/universal or, conversely, 
relativist/particular key. This is partly because I need to make this immense topic a 
little more manageable in the limited space at my disposal. Most importantly, 109  
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however, this is because I wish to stress the similarities between philosophy and theory, rather 
than their differences. Instead of following Jameson in distinguishing between the 
transcendence of philosophy and the immanence of theory, I will focus on the 
relation between theoretical work at large (including philosophy), on the one hand, 
and the concept and activity of abstraction on the other. Of course, postmodern and 
poststructuralist theories might employ very different abstractions than those 
mobilised by Enlightenment philosophy, for example. Still, whilst all philosophy is, 
to an extent, theory, and whilst not all theory is philosophy, to theorise, in my view, 
inevitably involves abstracting. Attempts at generality might be exercised to different 
degrees, and denotations of the concept of an ‘abstract structure’ may vary greatly. 
Yet, I would say that it is the capacity of all theoretical work (philosophical or not) to 
abstract that remains, if not transcendent, then at least transcendental. 
 
In this sense, I propose that in order to address what theory in the twenty-first 
century might be (or what its frequently announced end might amount to), one 
should address the ways in which the act of theorising is often understood, both 
scholarly and popularly (and, as seen above, by Jameson himself), in terms of 
creating an abstract system. This system might be closed and absolute, open-ended 
and relative, or neither; nonetheless, it still involves a degree of (theoretical) distance 
from the very same reality that that system was meant to describe in the first place. 
This distance has often alienated people and generated aversions to theoretical work 
amongst students and university departments. The task, then, which I cannot fully 
take on here, but which I can at least point towards, is that of exposing a false 
conception pertaining to this distance; i.e. the view according to which, if to theorise 
is to abstract from observation, then to abstract or speculate is in turn to disengage 
from matter and facts. My aim is to show that abstraction is not some kind of 
contemplative removal from the world, but is in fact intrinsic to the latter, and to 
how we experience it. 
 
 
3. Theoretical Distance 
My argument for the salience of this task involves turning to an old, but still relevant 
differentiation: that between ‘traditional theory’ on the one hand, and ‘critical theory’ 
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on the other. I am of course referring here to Max Horkheimer, who first made that 
distinction and posed it as the programmatic cornerstone for the intellectual project 
of the Frankfurt School. 
 
Horkheimer’s 1937 essay, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, defines theory as “stored 
up knowledge, put in a form that makes it useful for the closest possible description 
of facts” (2002: 188). The aim of theory is to systematically explain and interpret 
facts via conceptual structures and deductively enclosed systems of propositions. In 
this respect, “[t]he real validity of the theory depends on the derived propositions 
being consonant with the actual facts. If experience and theory contradict each other, 
one of the two must be re-examined” (ivi). In the essay, however, Horkheimer 
exposes the weaknesses of this methodology and definition of theory. What he calls 
‘traditional theory’ uses unquestioned concepts and modes of thought to test 
hypotheses vis-à-vis facts. Horkheimer argues that the conceptual apparatuses of 
‘traditional theory’ are indeed instrumental to types of knowledge that are already 
looking for particular kind of results. In this sense, traditional theory does not 
recognise that “bringing hypotheses to bear on facts is an activity that goes on, 
ultimately, not in the savant’s head but in industry” (196). To put this otherwise, 
traditional theory misses that science (and theory at large) always works “in the 
context of real social processes” (194), and according to the needs of the latter. By 
refusing to acknowledge its historical dimension, traditional theory ends up 
perpetuating the ideological assumptions of the society in which it is situated. To 
traditional theory, then, Horkheimer opposes an emancipatory ‘critical theory’ of 
society, which is “dominated at every turn by a concern for reasonable conditions of 
life” (199), and whose purpose, by contrast, is to assess the individual’s “web of 
relationships with the social totality and with nature” (211). 
 
Detailing the specificities of critical theory goes beyond the aim of my essay. It 
should suffice here to say that Horkheimer’s argument is interesting in the context of 
the present paper because it helps us to highlight how theory, and the act of 
theorising, are not necessarily operations that are meant to leave reality behind, but 
are instead concerned with how to live in the world, and with how we can avoid 
being so absorbed in it as to lose any critical perspective upon it. It is then relevant, 
in my view, to address Horkheimer’s differentiation between traditional and critical 111  
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theory. This is because, whilst the former is satisfied with operating within an 
existent social framework, the latter is instead concerned with questioning the 
characteristics of that framework in order to change it. In this sense, doing theory (in 
its critical mode), or adopting a theoretical distance, involves going beyond the mere 
observation of a given datum and towards self-reflection. This self-reflection, in turn, 
amounts to recognising oneself as different from one’s object of study and yet part 
of a mutual self-determination. 
 
It is useful here also to situate these considerations within the context of the 
Frankfurt School’s fierce condemnation of ‘positivist thinking’. In brief: positivism is a 
doctrine that was developed in the mid-nineteenth century by the French sociologist 
and philosopher, August Comte. It holds that true, valid or ‘positive’ knowledge 
should be based on the quantification of sensory experience. For positivists, all 
things are ultimately measurable, and all knowledge is ultimately objective. Famously, 
the Frankfurt School of critical theory interpreted positivism as a “trend towards the 
hypostatisation of science” (Horkheimer, 2013: 41). Thinkers such as Theodor W. 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer took issue with the idea of a value-free theory. They 
contested the pretence of objectivity of positivist sciences in general and, more 
specifically, the epistemological commitments of ‘logical positivism’ (i.e. a rationalist 
version of positivism developed in the early twentieth century, which championed 
the reduction of all knowledge to logical statements). Indeed, for the critical 
theorists, positivism epitomised a traditional mode of thought (and of theory) that 
confronts the world through fixed categories, and which has little regard for the 
specificities and contingencies of history. Moreover, and most interestingly from the 
perspective of the argument that I wish to develop, the Frankfurt School denounced 
positivism’s scientific focus on bare factuality, and attacked its lack of engagement 
with the subjective reasons (rather than objective causes) for how these bare facts 
came to be in the social world or as an act of the human mind. Positivism, in other 
words, is seen to uncritically and instrumentally accept empirical facts whilst 
bracketing out the possibility of addressing any of the contextual human and social 
abstractive structures that shape such facts. The positivist conformism to facts, then, 
is viewed as a sort of dogma or truth, expressed “under the distortion of making it 
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exclusive” (Horkheimer, 2013: 64), and under the expectation of obtaining certain 
results, geared towards specific needs. 
 
The theoretical work of the Frankfurt School profoundly challenged the assumption 
that data (or numbers, as Anderson would want to put it) can speak for themselves. 
Rather, it pushed for a reflective distance from the datum of experience: a reflective 
distance that would allow for a deeper, more meaningful way of engaging with said 
experience, in manners that would not just simply suit predetermined operational 
schemas. Thus, although the critical thought that the Frankfurt School proposed is 
not praxis (and Adorno in particular was keen to stress this point; see Adorno, 2010), 
neither is it mere contemplation. Instead, thinking is already acting in the world. 
Abstractions, in turn, are not to be discarded but understood, perhaps through the 
production of more abstractions, which are never identical with facts. This is because 
the assumption of a bare factuality is already, for the thinkers associated with the 
Frankfurt School, a fiction. On this view, therefore, theoretical distance is necessary 
in order to prevent an object of study from becoming frozen or fixed, and to 
integrate it into the conceptual structures that afford an explanation or interpretation 
of it (but which never naturalise it). 
 
 
4. Knowledge Without Thought 
In order to bring these observations into the field of media theory, it is necessary to 
say something about the relation between the latter and abstraction. This involves 
addressing what a theoretical distance might be, and what it might entail if one is to 
adopt such a distance within or in relation to a media theoretical context. First of all, 
it should be stressed that just as there is no a single conception of theory, so too is 
there no unified understanding of media theory either. Moreover, just as theory often 
has a contested status in the academy, it sometimes seems that media studies would 
happily do without its theoretical side. This means that asking what theory in media 
studies aims to achieve entails considering this theoretical specificity in relation to 
other intellectual enquiries (such as those of cultural studies, sociology and science 
and technology studies, for instance) that also inform much of our current 
understanding of technological mediation. 
 113  
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I propose now to do precisely this by returning once again to Anderson’s Wired 
article (Anderson, 2008). This article was not aimed at media theorists, but the way in 
which such theorists might respond to it can help us to clarify the scope and 
implications of media-theoretical debates. In this respect, we must begin by 
observing that Anderson’s argument for the end of theory is an argument about the 
obsolescence of the scientific method. Anderson is concerned not with the role of 
speculation in the humanities, but rather with that of hypotheses, experimentation 
and, above all, models in the sciences. This is not to deny that his claims pertain to 
work in the humanities. In fact, they seem intended to carry distinct implications in 
that regard. However, it is interesting to note that Anderson’s explicit target is the 
methodology of theoretical science, which is pitched against that of applied 
technology. 
 
Anderson observers that we are living “in the most measured age in history”. This 
condition, he claims, calls for “an entirely different approach” to knowledge. The 
modus operandi of Google exemplifies, in Anderson’s view, the epistemological turn 
offered by computation. Google did not assume, or indeed know, anything about 
advertising before becoming the biggest player in the business. Rather, it became so 
simply by using “better data” and “better analytic tools”. Testable hypotheses, then, 
are a thing of the past, insofar as Big Data allows the luxury of not caring for 
objective causes or subjective reasons, and of focusing solely on correlations. The key 
example that Anderson advances is the gene-sequencing work of the American 
biotechnologist and geneticist J. Craig Venter. “Enabled by high-speed sequencers 
and supercomputers that statistically analyze the data they produce”, Anderson 
explains, “Venter went from sequencing individual organisms to sequencing entire 
ecosystems”, discovering, in the process, “thousands of previously unknown species 
of bacteria and other life-forms”. Venter, however, is not a modern-day Darwin, for 
he is not stuck “in the old way of doing science”. In distinction from Darwin, 
Anderson continues, Venter does not know what these new species look like, their 
behaviour or their morphology. In fact, Venter “can tell you almost nothing about 
the species he found.” All he possesses is “a statistical blip”, which nonetheless, 
helped him to advance biology “more than anyone else of his generation”. 
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For Anderson, this example illustrates his contention that “[we] can stop looking for 
models”, for we can “throw the numbers into the biggest computing clusters the 
world has ever seen and let statistical algorithms find patterns where science cannot”. 
These comments are indicative of the sense in which Anderson’s article implies a 
perspective that would welcome the prospect of our contemporary world becoming 
a kind of ‘Chinese room’. In John Searle’s famous thought experiment, a 
monolingual English speaker is locked in a room and given sets of Chinese writing, 
plus rules for correlating their elements with each other. Searle’s point is that the 
English speaker could become “so good at following the instructions” (1980: 418), 
that “from the point of view of someone outside the room” his or her responses are 
“absolutely indistinguishable from those of native Chinese speakers” (ivi). Yet, this 
person does not really speak the language, and does not understand it; he or she only 
correlates symbols, without much care for meaning. 
 
Searle used this thought experiment to claim that AI programmes might have syntax, 
but they lack semantics, and thus might present correct answers and yet still lack 
understanding. However, in relation to the epistemic prospect of an end of theory, 
delivered via computational automation, this concern does not seem to matter, and 
surely does not matter to Anderson, who is attacking the role of models in science 
because they constitute an abstraction from the immediacy of the correlation. 
Indeed, as argued by Morrison and Morgan (1999: 11), models in science are 
investigative mediators that represent “some aspect of the world, or some aspect of 
our theories about the world, or both at once”, and thus, one can comment, a 
humanist residue of the activity of thinking that, for Anderson, one must dispose of. 
 
Most illuminatingly, the philosopher, Bernard Stiegler (2016), has described this 
epistemic vision as a form of knowledge without thought. 2 This description is as 
conceptually poignant as it is alarming, for it implies that the end of theory, as 
announced by Anderson, might spell the end of understanding, and consequently, 
that of cognate faculties such as literacy and judgment. I would add to this that 
Anderson’s interpretation of current technoscientific practices can be understood as 
2 “The automated ‘knowledge’ celebrated by Anderson no longer needs to be thought. In the epoch of 
the algorithmic implementation of applied mathematics in computerized machines, there is no longer any 
need to think: thinking is concretized in the form of algorithmic automatons that control data-capture systems and 
hence make it obsolete” (Stiegler, 2016: 49). 115  
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a form of ‘hyper-positivism’, because of its total trust in data. However, his vision 
also challenges the twentieth-century positivist project, insofar as it discards the 
verifiability (or falsifiability) benchmarks of science that are considered key to 
‘positive knowledge’. Equally, Anderson’s account of the end of theory carries an 
explicit empiricist character that, whilst celebrating the instrumentality of 
technoscientific observation (and the computer as the instrument of all instruments, 
in this case), also in a sense rejects empiricism by denying the usefulness of any 
observer, thus ultimately emptying empirical research itself of the source of its 
inferential power. 
 
 
5. Media Theory After the Computational Turn 
What, then, could media theorists do when faced with the prospect of knowledge 
without thought? In my view, they should defend the possibility of thought in 
knowledge even after the computational turn in culture and society. If to work 
theoretically is to work with understanding as an aim, then, to borrow Adorno’s 
words, “one should hold on to theory, precisely under the general coercion toward 
praxis in a functional and pragmatized world” (2010: 273). I would also add, 
however, that one should hold on to media theory in particular, and that the need to 
do so is exacerbated by the present compulsion for (Big) data to functionally and 
pragmatically replace hermeneutics. My claim here is thus as follows: although I 
would certainly recognise that not all media theory is ‘new media theory’, and that 
not all of that field is strictly preoccupied with the digital, media studies, in its 
theoretical dimensions, is in a privileged position to understand the epistemological 
implications of computational technologies. 
 
In this respect, media theory opens up, and can also overlap with, what is now 
frequently referred to as media philosophy. Within academia, the expression ‘media 
philosophy’ might denote the specific German-speaking context from which it 
emerged, and might thus refer to those scholarly efforts that have attempted to 
create a discipline capable of rethinking the ‘medium’ in relation to human and non-
human subjectivities. However, the term ‘media philosophy’ might also be 
appropriated and used more broadly, in order to indicate a multifaceted theoretical 
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investigation of modes of experience and being that are engendered by, or which 
exist in relation with, media systems in general. It is in this sense that I adopt the 
term here, whilst also acknowledging the break that it might signal from the agenda 
of communication studies, which media studies has, in part, adopted for historical 
and genealogical reasons. 
 
Media philosophy, understood in the sense proposed here, is not opposed to media 
theory, but is instead its ally in the pursuit of the creation of concepts suited to 
addressing the way in which we act, perceive and think in a highly techno-mediated 
world. Returning to my previous claim that the act of theorising can be understood 
in terms of abstracting, I would now add that the relation between media-theoretical 
work and abstraction is one of concept-making. In other words, one of the key ‘ends’ 
of media theory, in terms of its aims and purposes, is conceptualisation: it is to create 
conceptual structures via abstractive means, and to explain and interpret facts 
through and in relation to these structures. A theoretical and reflective distance is 
important to allow for conceptualisation to follow from problematisation. I understand 
the difference between a concept and a problem in the same manner that Gilles 
Deleuze did. For him, “concepts are only created as a function of problems”, in the 
sense that “concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no 
meaning and which can themselves only be isolated or understood as their solution 
emerges” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 16). Problematisation then precedes 
conceptualisation because the concepts of philosophy (and of theory alike) are meant 
to do something: they must address a problem that ‘we’ (as culture and society, or 
simply as thinking subjects) are confronted with. 
 
For Deleuze, the freedom to identify and constitute a problem is the freedom that 
characterises both the nature and the destiny of philosophy (and theory). This 
Deleuzian argument, which draws from Bergson, is quite an unusual stance in the 
history of thought, which, arguably, would rather make philosophy (and theory) the 
intellectual space where solutions (and not problems) are to be found. However, for 
Deleuze, the questions that intellectual work might pose are more important than 
their respective answers. For him, “it is the problem which orientates, conditions and 
engenders solutions”, although “these do not resemble the conditions of the 
problem” (Deleuze, 2004: 264). 117  
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In relation to this Deleuzian position, it can be argued that media theory (and media 
philosophy as well) offers the intellectual space to think computation precisely as a 
problem; as a problem in need of relevant concepts. Media theory can then think the 
computational, and its epistemological implications, because it does not take digital 
technologies as instruments or tools for knowing more, but as objects of study which 
we should know more about. On this view, what computational media can explain is 
not so important; rather, it is these computational media themselves that must be 
explained. Moreover, the Deleuzian argument about problematisation can provide 
further evidence that to adopt a theoretical stance is not a withdrawal from the 
world, but is instead a form of commitment to it. It is then possible to expand on 
Deleuze’s position in a manner that accords with a very different tradition of 
thought, that of the Frankfurt School, discussed earlier, in order to continue to claim 
that media theory can cast thought as part of the process of generating knowledge 
(to refer to Stiegler’s argument) after the computational turn, precisely because it can 
think the transformations of thinking by ‘thinking technologies’. 
 
In the little space that I have left here I want to bring to the fore yet another voice 
that can help us to make this claim, and to thereby show once again the relation 
between theory and abstraction as one that is key to determining the ends (and not 
‘the end’) of theoretical projects. This is the voice of the mathematician and 
philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead, who published his masterpiece, Process and 
Reality, in 1929, less than a couple of decades before Adorno and Horkheimer wrote 
theirs (Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1944), and who had different, but equally strong, 
motives for refusing to endorse the positivist trends of his time. 
 
Whitehead’s work is not a critical theory of society, but a cosmological endeavour to 
construct an ontology that could work vis-à-vis the mathematics and science of the 
twentieth century. Yet, like the Frankfurt School writers, Whitehead also profoundly 
disagreed with the contention that something like a “brute fact” (Whitehead, 1967: 8) 
could ever exist. There are many obscure and technical elements in Whitehead’s 
philosophy, whose introduction and explanation exceed the scope and focus of the 
present essay. All I wish to draw attention to here, however, is the manner in which 
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Whitehead stressed, forcefully, that data is not actuality, but quantifiable records of it. 
What the ‘scientific materialism’ (i.e. positivism) of his time celebrated as ‘matter’, 
then, is already an abstraction from the immediacy of experience. The latter is seen 
by positivism as a collection of empty and neutral factualities in need of 
interpretation. For Whitehead, however, thought (or any mental consideration or 
‘pole’, in Whitehead’s vocabulary) is not external to facts, but internal to them, and to 
the constitution of the world. 
 
How do these considerations relate to our concerns? First of all, Whitehead allows us 
to understand the central role that procedures of abstraction play in every act of 
experience. Most interestingly, Whitehead’s argument is both epistemological and 
ontological: to exist is already to be abstracting. Whenever theorists are accused of 
being too abstract, one can refer to Whitehead and consider his view that there is no 
such thing as a non-abstractive access to facts. Indeed, it is abstraction that allows us 
to ‘ingress’ (a very Whiteheadian verb) reality. So, to abstract is not to move away 
from the real, but rather to enter it, and to construct it in terms of its actuality. 
 
Secondly, introducing Whitehead’s position allows us to move from critique to 
speculation, i.e. to highlight the speculative side of what theory can do. In this respect, 
I would say that the Whiteheadian observation that abstraction is a fundamental 
mode of experiencing can be linked to media theory in this way. It can be stressed 
that the abstractions of media theory are addressing what is, ultimately, another 
abstraction: technology. This is, in turn, an abstraction that should be situated 
amongst many more abstractions, such as language, for example. In this sense, 
abstraction becomes not only a mode of enquiry but an object (or part of the object) 
of enquiry in its own right. We move then from epistemology to ontology by 
highlighting that abstraction is constitutive not only of how one might know in the 
world, but also of how one might be in the world. Abstraction is not outside and 
apart from the object, but can be located within it. With Whitehead, the theoretical 
distance that this essay has addressed becomes the space necessary for the actuality 
(of technology, as an abstraction alongside other abstractions) to emerge and 
develop. 
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